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REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS:  
THE ONGOING DILEMMA AFTER  
FTC V. ACTAVIS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act—also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act1—in an effort to 
lower the cost of pharmaceuticals by promoting competition in the generic 
drug market and incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation. 2  The Hatch-
Waxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 3 and 
provided an expedited process for the entry of generic drugs into the 
marketplace. 4  An unintended result of the Hatch-Waxman Act is the 
phenomenon of reverse payment settlements.5 These settlements arise out 
of patent infringement suits brought by brand-name drug manufacturers 
against generic drug manufacturers that are trying to enter the market 
through the expedited process provided for under the Hatch-Waxman Act.6 
The typical reverse payment settlement involves payment by the brand-
name drug manufacturer to the generic drug manufacturer in exchange for a 
promise to delay the release of the generic version of a given drug to the 
marketplace. 7  These settlements are often coined “pay-for-delay” 
settlements, particularly by those who oppose them such as the Federal 
Trade Commission (the FTC).8 
The practice of reverse payment settlements has both its opponents and 
proponents. Reverse payment settlements are highly opposed by the FTC, 
wholesale and retail pharmacies, and consumers. 9  By blocking entry of 
generic drug manufacturers and thereby eliminating competition, the FTC 
claims that these settlements raise potential antitrust violations under the 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.); Colleen Kelly, Article, 
The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 
Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417 (2011). 
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. 
 3. Kelly, supra note 1, at 417.  
 4. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). 
 5. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 281, 283 (2011); Francis P. Newell & Jonathan M. Grossman, Increased Scrutiny of 
Reverse Payment Settlements; Recent Cases in E.D. of PA and 2nd Circuit Suggest Change May 
Be Ahead for Pharma Clients, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 22, 2010, at LIT7. 
 6. See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494–95 (2007). 
 7. See id. (defining various types of reverse payment settlements). 
 8. E.g., FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS 
BILLIONS 2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FTC STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-
trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
 9. Id.; see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. 
Ct. 2849 (2013). 
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Sherman Act, which prohibits certain restraints on trade. 10 Furthermore, 
because of the delayed release of generic versions of drugs, reverse 
payment settlements have a significant financial impact on the consumers 
of pharmaceutical products.11 Due to these concerns, among others, many 
reverse payment settlements lead to antitrust litigation. 12  Proponents of 
reverse payment settlements argue that these settlements help avoid hefty 
costs that arise from lengthy litigation13 and can promote competition by 
leading to earlier generic market entry than would have been allowed under 
the brand-name drug patent.14 
Reverse payment settlements present issues about how to deal with the 
intersection of patent law and antitrust law and balance the concerns of the 
various stakeholders. Recognizing this dilemma, Congress has attempted to 
resolve the problems caused by reverse payment settlements for several 
years through two pending bills.15 One legislative attempt is the Preserve 
Access to Affordable Generics Act bill, which would create a presumption 
that reverse payment settlements are unlawful 16  and would grant broad 
authority to the FTC to regulate these settlements. 17  The other major 
legislative attempt is the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act 
bill proposed by Congressmen Rush and Waxman. 18  This bill would 
prohibit the generic drug manufacturer from receiving anything of value in 
exchange for delay or other inactivity in the market.19 
                                                                                                                                       
 10. See 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 3, 5; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Jon Leibowitz, 
Chairman, FTC, Address at the Center for American Progress, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ 
Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) 4 (June 23, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/pay-delay-
settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-
protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf (arguing that reverse payment settlements are 
anticompetitive). 
 11. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.  
 12. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug 
Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 13. Newell & Grossman, supra note 5, at LIT7.  
 14. Holman, supra note 6, at 495 (explaining how certain reverse payment settlements “can 
promote competition by providing a guaranteed reduction in the effective patent term that would 
not have occurred absent the patent challenge”). 
 15. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. (2013); Protecting 
Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2013, H.R. 3709, 113th Cong. (2013); Tania 
Khatibifar, Note, The Need for a Patent-Centric Standard of Antitrust Review to Evaluate Reverse 
Payment Settlements, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1351, 1355 n.17 (2013). 
 16. S. 214 § 28(a)(2). 
 17. Id. § 28(e). 
 18. H.R. 3709. 
 19. Id. § 2(a). 
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In addition to the public policy concerns expressed by executive 
agencies, consumers, and congressmen, reverse payment settlements 
divided the circuit courts for years until the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the split in FTC v. Actavis.20 The Court adopted the 
“rule of reason” test, which requires courts to determine whether the reverse 
payment settlement in question unreasonably restrains competition.21 Under 
the “rule of reason” test, the Court held that “likelihood of a reverse 
payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its 
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its 
independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and 
the lack of any other convincing justification.”22 However, the Court left 
many questions unanswered, 23  which will likely result in significant 
discrepancies amongst the lower courts. 
While the Court’s efforts were an improvement for invoking antitrust 
scrutiny, a major problem with reverse payment settlements remains—the 
underlying patents of brand-name manufacturers are not being examined on 
their merits. 24 This latest action by the Court represents a swing of the 
pendulum away from protecting the exclusionary rights provided by a 
patent under the “scope of the patent” test, toward enforcing stricter 
antitrust scrutiny under the “rule of reason” test.25 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court, by adopting the “rule of 
reason” test, failed to achieve the proper balance between pharmaceutical 
patent rights and concerns about the anticompetitive effects of reverse 
payment settlements. While the Court addressed the antitrust concern by 
invoking antitrust scrutiny that had been lacking, the Court failed to 
sufficiently protect the property interests and economic incentives that 
guide the pharmaceutical industry, which might ultimately stifle 
competition. Consequently, the balance intended by the Hatch-Waxman Act 
has not been achieved and must be resolved. Part I will present a 
background on the generic drug FDA approval process, how this process 
creates the reverse payment settlement phenomenon, the arguments for and 
against reverse payment settlements, and the antitrust standards that are 
typically applied by the courts when an agreement raises antitrust concerns. 
Part II will briefly analyze the circuit split leading up to the Actavis 
                                                                                                                                       
 20. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 2237. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Kevin McDonald et al., Antitrust Alert: Supreme Court Holds Reverse Payment 
Settlements Potentially Anticompetitive—Further Guidance Awaits, JONES DAY (June 2013), 
http://www.jonesday.com/Antitrust-Alert--Supreme-Court-Holds-Reverse-Payment-Settlements-
Potentially-Anticompetitive--Further-Guidance-Awaits-06-29-2013/?RSS=true (last visited Apr. 
11, 2014). 
 24. Elai Katz, ‘Reverse Payments’ Shot Down in Third Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 2012, at 3. 
 25. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–37. 
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decision, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both the “scope of 
the patent” test adopted by the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit courts 
and the “quick look rule of reason” adopted by the Third Circuit. Part III 
will analyze Actavis, the Supreme Court’s adoption of the “rule of reason” 
test, and why this new test fails to sufficiently protect patent rights. Part IV 
proposes that legislative action is necessary following the Actavis decision 
to fully address the inherent conflict between antitrust considerations and 
patent rights posed by reverse payment settlements. 
I. A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS 
A. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
For a prescription drug to be produced and marketed in the United 
States, it must first be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (the 
FDA).26 In order to obtain approval by the FDA, the drug manufacturer 
must submit a New Drug Application (NDA), which requires extensive 
information on the development of the drug, including results of safety 
testing and any patents granted for the drug.27 The process of completing 
safety testing is very time-consuming and expensive.28 In order to protect 
the expenditures that go into the research and development of a brand-name 
drug and the profits that will flow from its sales, brand-name drug 
manufacturers typically apply for a patent based on the chemical 
formulation of the drug prior to applying to the FDA.29 These patents can 
be granted for up to twenty years, 30  which allows the brand-name 
manufacturer to reap the benefits of higher, brand-name prices for a 
significant amount of time. Meanwhile, generic drug manufacturers are 
unable to introduce a generic version while the exclusionary protection 
provided under the brand-name drug patent is in effect.31 
The approval process for generic drug approval by the FDA is less 
cumbersome than that of a brand-name drug because of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, which was enacted in part to “jumpstart generic competition” by 
shortening the application process and therefore the time it takes for generic 
drugs to make it to market.32 To this end, generic drug manufacturers can 
apply for FDA approval using the Abbreviated New Drug Application (the 
                                                                                                                                       
 26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
 27. Kelly, supra note 1, at 417.  
 28. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)). 
 29. Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou 
/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm100100.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 418. 
 32. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)). 
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ANDA).33 The ANDA allows the generic drug manufacturer to “rely on the 
FDA’s prior determinations of safety and efficacy made in considering the 
application of the patented drug.” 34  This statutory provision allows the 
generic drug manufacturer to avoid “the major investment in inventing and 
developing the drug.”35 
As a part of this process, the generic drug manufacturer must certify 
that the generic drug does not infringe upon a valid brand-name drug patent 
by choosing one of four options.36 The fourth option, commonly known as a 
“paragraph IV certification,” is itself an act of patent infringement.37 After 
the generic drug manufacturer has filed the ANDA and provided notice to 
any brand-name manufacturers with potentially affected patents, the brand-
name manufacturer has forty-five days to bring a patent infringement suit 
against the generic drug manufacturer.38 If litigation is initiated by a brand-
name drug patent holder, then the FDA approval is granted either at the end 
of a thirty-month period after the date of the paragraph IV certification 
filing or, if earlier, then “on—(aa) the date on which the court enters 
judgment reflecting the decision; or (bb) the date of a settlement order or 
consent decree signed and entered by the court stating that the patent that is 
the subject of the certification is invalid or not infringed.” 39 Given this 
“automatic stay” that occurs,40 settlement is a “natural consequence” of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.41 These settlements are known as “reverse payment 
settlements” or “exclusion agreements” because they typically involve 
funds flowing from the brand-name drug patent holder to the generic drug 
manufacturer, which is atypical in patent infringement cases.42 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also encourages generic drug manufacturers to 
enter the market by providing for a 180-day exclusivity period during which 
                                                                                                                                       
 33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 34. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)). 
 35. Gerald Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases Challenging Hatch-
Waxman Settlements, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 47, 50 (2010). 
 36. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), a generic drug company can certify that the given 
generic drug does not infringe upon a brand-name patent by claiming  
(i) that such patent information has not been filed, (ii) that such patent has expired, (iii) of the 
date on which such patent will expire, or (iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is 
submitted. 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) explains that it is an act of infringement to file an ANDA 
application under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) when the brand-name drug that the ANDA is based on has a 
patent, which is the case in a paragraph IV certification.  
 38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 39. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).  
 40. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013). 
 41. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 42. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204; Holman, supra note 6, at 494.  
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the FDA will not approve any other ANDA applications made by other 
generic manufacturers of the given drug.43 This 180-day period does not 
begin until the original ANDA filer begins to offer its generic version on 
the market.44 In addition, it is only available to the first ANDA filer of a 
given drug, “meaning that even if the first filer never becomes eligible to 
use its 180-day exclusivity period because it settles, loses, or withdraws the 
litigation that potential benefit will not pass to subsequent filers.”45 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was amended in 2003 in order to address 
antitrust concerns of monopoly and collusion and “to put an end to this 
exploitation of the provision in Hatch-Waxman that grants a short-term 
protection from competition to the first manufacturer to bring a generic 
version of a brand-name drug to market.”46 Through the 2003 amendments, 
the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice (the DOJ) became major 
players in the scrutiny of reverse payment settlements. 47  One of the 
provisions of the amended Hatch-Waxman Act provides that brand-name 
and generic drug manufacturers that enter into settlements of their patent 
litigation cases must notify both the FTC and DOJ of the settlements so that 
the settlements can be analyzed for potential antitrust violations.48 Both the 
FTC and the DOJ can review the settlements for potential antitrust 
violations and are able to challenge the legality of the settlements in court.49 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
The FTC has long been opposed to reverse payment settlements and has 
urged the courts to find them per se illegal.50 The FTC reports that “brand-
name pharmaceutical companies can delay generic competition that lowers 
prices by agreeing to pay a generic competitor to hold its competing 
product off the market for a certain period of time.”51 A 2010 FTC study 
reported that these settlements delay generic entry for roughly seventeen 
months.52 Under the influence of the Obama administration, the DOJ has 
                                                                                                                                       
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 44. Id.  
 45. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)).  
 46. See S. REP. NO. 107-167, at 4 (2002). 
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 48. Id.; see also Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse 
Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment 
Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 61 n.5 (2010). 
 49. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 48, at 61 n.5.  
 50. Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and 
Urging Reversal at 22, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2078, 
10-2077, 10-2079), 2011 WL 2115235 at *22. 
 51. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2. 
 52. Id.  
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also recently begun to take up the position argued by the FTC that reverse 
payment settlements should be subject to a presumption of invalidity.53 
In addition to these government agencies, reverse payment settlements 
are opposed by consumers,54 as well as wholesale and retail pharmacies.55 
Like consumers, pharmacies are subject to the higher costs of brand-name 
drugs when generics are excluded from the market.56 However, the crux of 
the burden is carried by consumers.57 The FTC estimates that consumers 
would pay up to ninety percent less for generic drugs than they currently 
spend on brand-name drugs.58 The 2010 FTC study reported that pay-for-
delay settlements cost consumers an additional $3.5 billion each year for 
their drug expenses.59 These high consumer costs are a major concern of 
consumer advocacy groups60 and the FTC.61 
C. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Proponents of reverse payment settlements argue that these settlements 
actually allow generics to enter the market prior to the expiration of valid 
patents.62 Therefore, these settlements provide lower-cost, generic drugs to 
consumers sooner than if generic drug manufacturers were to simply wait 
for brand-name patents to expire.63 Furthermore, these settlements protect 
the exclusivity granted to the brand-name drug manufacturer through its 
patent, which encourages further research and development of 
pharmaceuticals.64 In addition, reverse payment settlements are supported 
by both courts65 and litigants66 as a way to reduce the time, money, and 
uncertainty that accompanies litigation.67 
                                                                                                                                       
 53. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 48, at 61.  
 54. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.  
 55. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 202.  
 56. Id. at 221–22. 
 57. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.  
 58. Id. at 1. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See generally Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of AARP and the Prescription 
Access Litigation Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, FTC v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2454841 (explaining how reverse payment 
settlements that delay entry of generics harm consumers by preventing access to lower cost 
generic drugs). 
 61. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.  
 62. Sophia Pearson & Jeff Bliss, Schering-Plough’s K-Dur Pay-for-Delay Ruling Reversed, 
BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-16/schering-
plough-s-k-dur-pay-for-delay-ruling-reversed.html. 
 63. See Nanci Bompey, More Pay-for-Delay Challenges Possible as SCOTUS, FTC Weigh 
Options, FDA WK., Aug. 31, 2012, at 11. 
 64. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 418.  
 65. Sobel, supra note 35, at 69–70. 
 66. Newell & Grossman, supra note 5, at LIT7.  
 67. Id. 
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D. HOW REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS PRESENT AN 
ANTITRUST CONCERN 
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby 
declared to be illegal.” 68 Nonetheless, the courts have traditionally only 
held unreasonable restraints of trade to be violations of the Sherman Act.69 
The default standard of analysis for an antitrust claim is known as the “rule 
of reason” test,70 which the Supreme Court has delineated: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such 
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question 
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint 
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, 
are all relevant facts.71 
The burden-shifting involved in the “rule of reason” test includes three 
parts. 72  First, anti-competitive effects must be demonstrated by the 
plaintiffs. 73  Then, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the 
challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.” 74 
Finally, this showing may be rebutted if the plaintiff can show that the 
conduct is not necessary to the pro-competitive objective given by the 
defendant.75 
While a full analysis under the “rule of reason” test is typically 
required, there are some restraints of trade that have such a harmful and 
predictable effect without providing any pro-competitive benefits that they 
are per se unlawful. 76  When per se unlawful agreements occur, “no 
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive 
character of such an agreement.”77 Examples of practices that are per se 
                                                                                                                                       
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 69. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 
457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). 
 70. See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10. 
 71. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 72. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013).  
 73. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 74. Id. at 669. 
 75. Id.  
 76. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 
5 (1958). 
 77. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
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unlawful include price fixing, tying arrangements, 78  and market 
allocation.79 
Finally, a level of intermediate scrutiny exists between these two 
extremes known as the “quick look rule of reason.”80 This test is used when 
the per se unlawful analysis is not suitable because the negative effects of a 
particular restraint on trade are not immediately obvious. 81  Under the 
“quick look rule of reason” test, anticompetitive behavior is presumed to 
have occurred and “the defendant must promulgate ‘some competitive 
justification’ for the restraint.”82 If the defendant is unable to justify its 
behavior, then the presumption of harm stands.83 These three tests—the 
“rule of reason,” per se unlawfulness, and the “quick look rule of reason”—
make up the traditional approaches to antitrust litigation and form the basis 
of review for the antitrust claims of reverse payment settlement litigation. 
Based on this framework, reverse payment settlements raise antitrust 
concerns as unreasonable restraints on trade.84 The FTC has argued that 
they illegally preserve the brand-name manufacturer’s monopoly through 
the delay of the generic drug.85 Specifically, it is commonly argued that 
reverse payment settlements are a classic example of per se illegal 
horizontal agreements86 in that they “permit the sharing of monopoly rents 
between would-be competitors.”87 Not only do these agreements present the 
concern that the brand-name drug manufacturers will collude in order to 
reap the benefits of higher drug prices, but another concern exists that 
relates to potential generic drug manufacturers. Due to the 180-day 
exclusivity period that is granted to the first ANDA filer, any settlement 
between the first ANDA filer and the brand-name manufacturer will not 
only benefit those two parties, but will also block any other generic 
manufacturers during this period.88 Both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have 
expressed concern over this type of antitrust violation.89 
                                                                                                                                       
 78. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. 
 79. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
 80. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Kelly, supra note 1, at 463–64.  
 85. See 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.  
 86. Kelly, supra note 1, at 464. 
 87. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013). 
 88. While the 180-day exclusionary period can potentially block competition, this has been 
ameliorated by an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act made by the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. Kelly, supra note 1, at 465. The amendment, 
known as the “failure to market” provision, requires that the 180-day exclusionary period be 
forfeited when the settlement agreement holds that the patent was invalid or not infringed and the 
first ANDA filer fails to market its approved generic drug. However, this new amendment does 
not prevent all situations in which market entry can be blocked by the 180-day exclusivity period, 
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E. OVERVIEW OF PATENT LAW 
Intersecting with antitrust law in the reverse payment settlement cases 
is patent law, which governs the treatment of the underlying drug patent. 
When a brand-name drug manufacturer is granted a patent, it has a right to 
exclude others from producing its patented drug and to seek injunctive 
relief for any infringement of the patent.90 This grant is made in order to 
provide an appropriate incentive to the patentee for investing in research 
and development. 91  This type of exclusionary power is allowed, even 
though it can decrease competition and result in high prices. 92  Another 
benefit of obtaining a patent is that when the patent is challenged, it is 
presumed to be valid.93 
Antitrust claims are considered against this strong support of patents. 
However, although the patent does provide exclusionary rights, it does not 
grant power to violate antitrust law. 94  The Sherman Act limits the 
exclusionary power of a patent, as anything outside of the patent’s scope is 
subject to antitrust review.95 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT LEADING UP TO ACTAVIS 
A. “SCOPE OF THE PATENT” TEST 
Until the Actavis decision, circuit courts routinely applied the “scope of 
the patent” test to analyze reverse payment settlements.96 Under this test, 
“reverse payments are permitted so long as (1) the exclusion does not 
exceed the patent’s scope, (2) the patent holder’s claim of infringement was 
                                                                                                                                       
such as when the agreement does not make a finding of patent invalidity or lack of patent 
infringement. Id. 
 89. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
settlement in that case was “a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for 
Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of 
trade”); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the settlement in that case could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share 
and preserve monopolistic conditions”). 
 90. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 283 (2012); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 344 F.3d 1294, 
1304–05 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 91. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1304.  
 92. Id. at 1305.  
 93. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.  
 94. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912); see also Joseph 
Vardner, The Statutory Presumption of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
225, 226 (2011). 
 95. Vardner, supra note 94, at 226.  
 96. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug 
Co., 344 F.3d at 1312. 
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not objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not procured by fraud.”97 
The test included an underlying assumption that the patent in question was 
valid and, therefore, not reviewed on its merits.98 The courts applying the 
“scope of the patent” test did not apply antitrust scrutiny.99 Essentially, as 
long as the agreement was within the scope of the exclusions allowed under 
the patent, the court did not question whether an antitrust violation had 
occurred.100 Only if the settlement resulted in an arrangement that exceeded 
the patent would the settlement be subjected to antitrust scrutiny.101 
Several policy reasons supported the “scope of the patent” test. 102 
Arguably the strongest reason in favor of this test was that it encouraged 
settlement by not subjecting the reverse payment settlements to antitrust 
scrutiny as long as they were within the scope of the patent.103 Historically, 
the courts have favored settlement: “there is no question that settlements 
provide a number of private and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate 
and costly effects of litigation.”104 Settlements are especially encouraged in 
patent cases because litigation can significantly drain resources of both the 
courts and parties involved due to the complex issues involved. 105  The 
strong presumption of patent validity106 and the exclusionary powers of the 
patent107 are also strong policy reasons supporting this test. Additionally, by 
encouraging settlement, generic drug manufacturers have an incentive to 
bring a paragraph IV certification as they have more options for a favorable 
outcome when challenging a brand-name drug patent.108 
Although the “scope of the patent” test was strongly supported among 
the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits,109 its major weakness was that 
                                                                                                                                       
 97. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013); see also, e.g., In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212–13 (adopting the “scope of the patent” 
test); Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076 (upholding the “scope of the patent” test). 
 98. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312. 
 102. See, e.g., id. at 1294; In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen, 466 
F.3d 187; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d 1056.  
 103. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308.  
 104. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202 (citing Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1075). 
 105. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 n.20 (discussing the cost and complexity of patent 
litigation); see also Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that settlements should be encouraged as they decrease the burden on federal courts). 
 106. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 107. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 (explaining how the incentive for obtaining a patent 
would be undermined by subjecting reverse payment settlements that are within the scope of the 
patent to antitrust liability). 
 108. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A); Kelly, supra note 1, at 462–63. 
 109. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen, F.3d at 212; 
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312. 
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it presumed the validity of the patent,110 which in turn “assumes away the 
question being litigated in the underlying patent suit, enforcing a 
presumption that the patent holder would have prevailed.” 111  This is 
troublesome, particularly when it allows settlements based on weak or 
invalid patents to be protected without any judicial scrutiny, which has 
occurred in many instances.112 In essence, this presumption allows a brand-
name manufacturer who knows it has a weak patent “to buy [its] way out of 
both competition with the challenging competitor and possible invalidation 
of the patent,”113 a potential concern admitted by the Second Circuit. 114 
Overall, the test is criticized for being overly simplistic as it “assumes 
issues of validity and infringement that cannot possibly be determined from 
the mere issuance of the patent.”115 
Ultimately, the “scope of the patent” test failed to protect consumers 
because it was used to uphold reverse payment settlements based on weak 
or invalid patents. 116  By allowing settlement, the generic drug faces a 
delayed introduction to the market, during which time the higher costs of 
the brand-name drug are passed on to the consumer.117 Since the Hatch-
Waxman Act was designed to protect the consumer, the “scope of the 
patent” test did not adequately achieve this goal; it only facially protected 
the patent, not based on its underlying merits, but on the patent holder’s 
ability to pay the generic drug manufacturer off in order to prolong 
increased drug prices for consumers.118 
B. PER SE AND PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF VIOLATION TREATMENT 
IN EARLY CASES 
Earlier in the history of reverse payment settlement litigation, the Sixth 
and D.C. Circuits applied stricter antitrust scrutiny by deeming the 
settlements to be per se violations of the Sherman Act119 and prima facie 
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade, respectively. 120 In Andrx 
                                                                                                                                       
 110. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). 
 111. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. 
 112. Id. at 214–15 (stating that “[m]any patents issued by the PTO are later found to be invalid 
or not infringed, and a 2002 study conducted by the FTC concluded that, in Hatch-Waxman 
challenges made under paragraph IV, the generic challenger prevailed seventy-three percent of the 
time”). 
 113. Id. at 215 (citing In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211). 
 114. Id.  
 115. Michael Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent 
Settlement Problem, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6. 
 116. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 11 n.3.  
 117. Id. at 2. 
 118. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217. 
 119. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 120. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l., 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, the D.C. Circuit held 
the settlement to be prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation because 
the agreement could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market 
share and preserve monopolistic conditions.”121 The Sixth Circuit, in In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,122 held the reverse payment settlement in 
question to be a per se violation of antitrust laws because it was a 
“horizontal agreement to eliminate competition.” 123  These cases are 
instructive in developing a solution to addressing the reverse payment 
settlement dilemma as they illustrate how some courts that addressed this 
issue early on felt the need for a more stringent level of antitrust review. 
C. “QUICK LOOK RULE OF REASON”TEST 
The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation followed in the 
footsteps of the D.C. Circuit’s Andrx decision by treating reverse payment 
settlements as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.124 In doing so, 
the Third Circuit broke from the more recent trend of applying the “scope 
of the patent” test and adopted the “quick look rule of reason” test, which 
applies an intermediate level of antitrust scrutiny.125 In using this test, 
the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a generic 
patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie 
evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by 
showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry 
or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.126 
Under this test, the Third Circuit aligned itself with the FTC’s stance that 
the underlying patent does not need to be analyzed based on its merits 
because “it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was 
an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents 
an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”127 
Several policy reasons favored the “quick look rule of reason” test.128 
Most significantly, this test subjected reverse payment settlements to 
antitrust scrutiny and thereby encouraged competition.129 Therefore, the test 
worked to incorporate balance between patent protection and the antitrust 
                                                                                                                                       
 121. Id. This case has been distinguished because it did not involve a settlement that ended 
litigation, but rather it involved compensation from the brand-name manufacturer to the generic 
manufacturer while the litigation was ongoing. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210. 
 122. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908. 
 123. Id.  
 124. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003)). 
 128. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217–18. 
 129. Id.  
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concerns that arose in response to the increased competition the Hatch-
Waxman Act aimed to obtain.130 The “quick look rule of reason” test also 
protected the consumer by prohibiting unreasonable restraints to trade in the 
pharmaceutical industry that excessively prolonged the entry of generics 
under the given brand-name drug patent.131 
While the In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation holding had some 
advantages over the “scope of the patent” test, it also had its weaknesses. 
First, just as the “scope of the patent” test did not analyze the merits of the 
underlying patent, neither did the Third Circuit’s test.132 By not analyzing 
the underlying patent, the “quick look rule of reason” test could potentially 
fail to provide enough protection for valid or infringed patents. It is possible 
that a brand-name manufacturer would rationally choose to pay off a 
generic manufacturer to stop litigation or market entry, even if the brand-
name manufacturer knew it had a strong patent,133 but the Third Circuit’s 
test would make it harder for this type of agreement to be upheld. 
Furthermore, this test would likely discourage patent infringement litigation 
because the parties would know that any resulting settlements would be 
seen as presumptively illegal. 134  This could then lead to fewer drug 
manufacturers pursuing the introduction of a generic drug into the 
market.135 
 
III: FTC V. ACTAVIS: A RESOLUTION TO THE ANTITRUST 
PROBLEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF PATENT PROTECTION 
Given these two very different approaches to resolving antitrust claims 
based on reverse payment settlements, a clear need existed for the Supreme 
Court to step in and provide guidance.136 This guidance came with the FTC 
v. Actavis case, in which the Supreme Court adopted the “rule of reason” 
test for analyzing these settlements.137 
                                                                                                                                       
 130. Id. at 217. 
 131. Id. at 217–18.  
 132. Id. at 214.  
 133. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated 
by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (citing Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the 
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 134. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206 (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)). 
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Delay, FDA WK., Sept. 7, 2012, at 2 (explaining that fewer generic manufacturers will file 
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 136. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013). 
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The case began when Actavis, Inc. (known as Watson Pharmaceuticals 
at the time) and Paddock Laboratories, Inc. both filed for an ANDA for 
approval of a generic version of AndroGel based on paragraph IV 
certifications, which stated that the AndroGel patent was not valid and that 
their generics would not infringe upon the AndroGel patent. 138  Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the brand-name manufacturer of AndroGel, then 
initiated a patent infringement suit which eventually led to a settlement in 
which Solvay agreed to pay the generic drug manufacturers millions of 
dollars in order to delay market entry.139 The FTC then brought an antitrust 
claim against all of the parties to the settlement, claiming that they had 
unlawfully agreed to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits in violation of the 
Sherman Act. 140  The district court dismissed the FTC’s complaint for 
failing to state an antitrust violation, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed based on the “scope of the patent” test.141 
A. MAJORITY OPINION ADOPTING THE “RULE OF REASON” TEST 
The Supreme Court first discarded the “scope of the patent” test as the 
correct standard for reverse payment settlement antitrust cases.142 The Court 
noted that the “scope of the patent” test failed to consider antitrust issues, 
stating that “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by 
measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law 
policy.” 143  The value of settlements was also addressed, but the Court 
summarily set aside that principle in this context.144 The Court also rejected 
the “quick look rule of reason” test argued for by the FTC,145 finding that 
this type of test is only appropriate when “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets” and that reverse payment settlements did not meet 
that standard.146 
Instead, the Court adopted the “rule of reason” test147 and “answered 
the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust factors, such as 
likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and 
potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances, such 
                                                                                                                                       
 138. Id. at 2229. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 2229–30.  
 141. Id. at 2230.  
 142. Id. at 2231.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 2234.  
 145. Id. at 2237.  
 146. Id. 
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as here those related to patents.”148 In analyzing these antitrust factors, the 
Court highlighted “five sets of considerations” as to why the antitrust claim 
should have moved forward.149 These included (1) that a reverse settlement 
payment can have anticompetitive effects, (2) that sometimes these 
anticompetitive effects are unjustified, (3) “where a reverse payment 
threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely 
possesses the power to bring that harm about in practice,” for example by 
paying off a generic to maintain monopoly profits, (4) “an antitrust action is 
likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit 
believed,” and (5) that parties may settle patent cases through methods other 
than large, unjustified reverse payments like early entry without a 
payment.150 Finally, the Court concluded by leaving “to the lower courts the 
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”151 
B. DISSENTING OPINION ARGUING FOR THE CONTINUED USE OF 
THE “SCOPE OF THE PATENT” TEST 
The dissent, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, argued for the 
continued use of the “scope of the patent” test, emphasizing that patents are 
an important exclusion to antitrust law.152 The dissent also noted that brand-
name manufacturers may have rational reasons for paying off generics, 
even if they are nearly sure that their patents are valid or infringed.153 In 
criticizing the “amorphous”154 and “unruly”155 test adopted by the majority, 
the dissent argued that the “rule of reason” test may discourage the 
settlement of patent litigation.156 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S RESPONSE: A CONTINUING LACK OF 
BALANCE 
To assess Actavis and determine whether it will help to resolve the 
dilemma presented by reverse payment settlements, it is important to revisit 
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One of its overarching goals was to 
provide incentives that would allow for an appropriate balance between 
encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and encouraging the 
entry of generic versions of drugs to the market.157 Indeed, the Court in 
Actavis emphasized the need to consider both antitrust and patent policies in 
                                                                                                                                       
 148. Id. at 2231.  
 149. Id. at 2234.  
 150. Id. at 2234–37.  
 151. Id. at 2238.  
 152. Id. at 2238–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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this context.158 At the core of encouraging innovation among brand-name 
drug manufacturers is the protection provided by patents, which makes 
research and development costs worthwhile. 159  Meanwhile, antitrust 
scrutiny should be applied to ensure that generic drug manufacturers are not 
being bought out of the market by brand-name drug manufacturers 
attempting to retain their monopoly rents.160 Thus, the principles of patent 
and antitrust law stand in conflict with one another in the reverse payment 
settlement context 161  and should be carefully balanced to protect all 
stakeholders. 
The Supreme Court took a positive step forward in appropriately 
resolving the reverse payment settlement dilemma by determining that 
antitrust scrutiny must be applied to reverse payment settlements. 162 
Antitrust scrutiny was sorely lacking from the “scope of the patent” test line 
of decisions as discussed at length by the court in Actavis. 163  Antitrust 
concerns can arise in settlements that involve both valid and invalid 
patents,164 and the Supreme Court filled the void that was missing in cases 
that were decided under the “scope of the patent” test. Furthermore, by 
choosing the “rule of reason” test, the court provided for a flexible, case-by-
case approach,165 which is also consistent with the balance intended by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. However, to achieve true balance, patent law concerns 
must be addressed as well. 
Throughout the history of reverse payment settlements, there has been a 
significant lack of analysis of the underlying patent issues in these cases.166 
Actavis proved to be no exception.167 While the Court indicated early on in 
its opinion that one of the “traditional antitrust factors” included “those 
related to patents,”168 the court also stated that “it is normally not necessary 
                                                                                                                                       
 158. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
 159. Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical 
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/06/21/ftc-v-actavis-the-supreme-court-issues-a-reversal-on-reverse-payments/. 
 168. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
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to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question.”169 The Court 
further elaborates: 
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that 
the patentee has serious doubt about the patent’s survival. . . . [T]he size of 
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a 
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed 
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.170 
This analysis left it unclear how the lower courts should deal with the 
patent’s merits.171 In fact, this nearly implies that a large reverse payment 
settlement can be presumed to be unlawful, which makes this test seem 
more like the “quick look rule of reason.”172 By failing to give sufficient 
consideration to the patent issues, the Court’s decision represents a change 
from the lower courts’ emphasis on the protection provided for by the 
patent to the exclusion of the antitrust concerns, to a focus on the antitrust 
concerns to the exclusion of the protections provided by the patent. Reverse 
payment settlements arise due to patent infringement litigation.173 Since the 
original claim in the patent infringement litigation centers on the validity or 
infringement of a patent, it is natural to begin analysis of reverse payment 
settlements with the merits of the underlying patent.174  
Several policy reasons also support the need for analysis of the 
underlying patent. On a fundamental level, patents that have not been 
subjected to any type of review and are merely presumed to be valid should 
not be allowed to prevent a generic drug manufacturer from entering the 
market.175 The Supreme Court has supported the need for testing patents to 
eliminate those that are undeserving in prior cases, so that weak patents are 
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not used to harm the public.176 Moreover, the process through which patents 
are issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the USPTO) has been 
criticized as resulting in undeserving patents.177 Many recently challenged 
patents have later been declared invalid.178 
Although these considerations suggest a need for a review of the 
underlying patent, doing so would create a conundrum. If the lower courts 
must resolve the underlying patent claims, this could remove the reasons for 
entering into a reverse payment settlement in the first place.179 Thus, the 
incentives for challenging a patent through paragraph IV certification could 
decrease,180 as the generic drug manufacturer will not have as many options 
when challenging the patent. 
Additional problems with the “rule of reason” test adopted in Actavis 
could also have dampening effects on reverse payment settlements.181 As 
the analysis required under a “rule of reason” test is typically quite 
extensive and costly,182 the incentives for settling will be lowered. It is also 
possible that companies will be more hesitant to enter into reverse payment 
settlements if they will face stricter antitrust scrutiny.183 Since the Court left 
it to lower courts to develop the structure of the “rule of reason” test in this 
context,184 how exactly these cases will actually be handled remains to be 
seen.185 However, more confusion will certainly follow this decision as the 
lower courts once again try to address the problems associated with reverse 
payment solutions.186 
                                                                                                                                       
 176. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993); Cory Ingle, 
Reverse Payment Settlements: A Patent Approach to Defending the Argument for Illegality, 7 
ISJLP 503, 526 (2012) (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)). 
 177. See Ian Hastings, Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements, 
13 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 31, 62 (2011); see also Hemphill, supra note 175, at 706 (stating that patents 
receive limited scrutiny during the examination process at the USPTO). 
 178. Picht, supra note 174, at 119; Vardner, supra note 94, at 225 (citing Decisions for 2000–
2004, PATSTATS, http://www.patstats.org/2000-04.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2014)).  
 179. Picht, supra note 174, at 124.  
 180. See Bompey, supra note 135, at 11 (explaining that fewer generic manufacturers will file 
paragraph IV certifications). 
 181. See Jonathan Gardner, Limited Win for Both Sides in “Pay-for-Delay” Judgment, EP 
VANTAGE (June 18, 2013), http://www.epvantage.com/Universal/View.aspx?type=Story&id 
=436414&isEPVantage=yes; Bradley Graveline & Jennifer Driscoll-Chippendale, FTC v. 
Actavis: What Does It Mean for Reverse Payment Settlements?, FDA L. UPDATE BLOG (June 20, 
2013), http://www.fdalawblog.com/2013/06/articles/ip-and-technology-transactions/ftc-v-actavis-
what-does-it-mean-for-reverse-payment-settlements/. 
 182. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 48, at 114.  
 183. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 2238 (majority opinion).  
 185. Wright, supra note 171, at 15.  
 186. Graveline & Driscoll-Chippendale, supra note 181; McDonald et al., supra note 23. 
2014] Reverse Payment Settlements 535 
IV: THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT DILEMMA 
To resolve the ongoing legal problems and questions presented by 
reverse payment settlements, 187  Congress should step in once again to 
provide guidance on how to properly balance the tension between antitrust 
law and patent law. At times, this tension can seem irreconcilable.188 Under 
the “rule of reason” test articulated in Actavis, if a brand-name drug 
manufacturer can raise the defense of having a valid or infringed patent, 
then the antitrust suit may evolve into the very patent suit the reverse 
payment settlement was designed to avoid. 189  However, at the core of 
whether a reverse payment settlement is anticompetitive is whether it is 
based on a valid or infringed patent. Since the reverse payment settlement 
dilemma raises important policy considerations about whose interests to 
protect and how to deal with the intersection of patent law and antitrust law, 
a legislative approach would leave these questions in the hands of policy 
makers.190 Congress could alleviate the numerous questions remaining after 
Actavis once all of the policy considerations have been carefully balanced. 
Finally, legislation could help to benefit consumers more swiftly—those 
who are hurt the most by the delay of generic entry caused by reverse 
payment settlements191—by avoiding the years of judicial uncertainty that 
are likely to follow Actavis.192 
The two currently pending bills, The Protecting Consumer Access to 
Generic Drugs Act of 2013 and The Preserve Access to Affordable 
Generics Act, provide potential solutions. 193  By allowing for more 
flexibility in cases where reverse payment settlements are not 
anticompetitive, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act provides a 
superior legislative resolution.194 This bill would create a presumption of 
illegality for reverse payment settlements that delay generic entry into the 
market.195 The obvious advantage of this bill would be to provide a clear 
rule to be applied by the courts, thereby preserving judicial resources. 
Furthermore, by creating a presumption of illegality, it is highly likely that 
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fewer reverse payment settlements would be entered into, thus cutting down 
on the chances of potential delay in the market entry of generic drugs. In 
turn, consumers would benefit by gaining access to lower-cost generic 
drugs. 196  The major disadvantage to legislation is that reverse payment 
settlement suits would not be decided based on a flexible, case-by-case 
approach. 197  The presumption of illegality could be over-inclusive and 
prevent some settlements that are not anticompetitive. 198  However, the 
reverse payment settlement dilemma raises important policy considerations 
about whose interests to protect and how to deal with the intersection of 
patent law and antitrust law, and a legislative approach would at least leave 
these questions in the hands of policy-makers. 199  After all, the reverse 
payment settlement dilemma was created by legislators, and likewise it 
should be resolved by legislators.  
CONCLUSION 
With generics typically costing thirty to eighty percent less than their 
brand-name versions, and ten percent of the nation’s health care costs spent 
on prescription drugs, the generic drug market must be encouraged. 200 
However, it is only through innovation, research, and development of drugs 
protected by patents that future advances in the pharmaceutical industry will 
become available to consumers. 201  In analyzing any reverse payment 
settlement, a balance between these areas of law must be achieved in order 
to protect the various stakeholders. Before Actavis, the majority of the 
circuit courts upheld the exclusivity of the patent, but they presumed that 
antitrust scrutiny was unnecessary as long as the agreement was within the 
scope of the patent.202 Under Actavis, the Supreme Court went too far in 
correcting this shortcoming by downplaying the need for review of the 
underlying patent. Ultimately, as the reverse payment settlement dilemma 
presents important policy concerns, this issue should be dealt with by 
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Congress, which has addressed this issue in the past and continues to work 
toward a reasonable solution.203 
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